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ABSTRACT
From 1997 through early 2003, the United Nations Oil for Food Program allowed Iraq to export oil
in exchange for humanitarian supplies. We measure the extent to which this program was corrupted
by Iraq's attempts to deliberately set the price of its oil below market prices in an effort to solicit
bribes, both in the form of direct cash bribes and in the form of political favors, from the buyers of
the underpriced oil. We infer the magnitude of the potential bribe by comparing the gap between the
official selling price of Iraq's two crude oils (Basrah Light and Kirkuk) and the market price of
several comparison crude oils during the Program to the gap observed prior to the Program. We find
consistent evidence that underpricing of Basrah Light averaged $1 per barrel from 1997 through
1999 and reaches a peak (almost $3 per barrel) from May 2000 through September 2001. The
estimated underpricing quickly declines after the UN introduced a retroactive pricing scheme that
reduced Iraq's ability to set the price of its oil. The evidence on whether Kirkuk was underpriced is
less clear. Notably, we find that episodes of underpricing of Basrah Light are associated with a
decline in the share of major oil multinationals among the oil buyers, and an increase in the share
of obscure individual traders. The observed underpricing of Iraqi oil suggests that Iraq generated $5
billion in rents through its strategic underpricing. Of this amount, we estimate that Iraq collected $0.7
to $2 billion in bribes (depending on Iraq's share of the rents implied by the price gap), which is
roughly 1 to 3 percent of the total value of oil sales under the Program. Finally, we find little
evidence that underpricing was associated with increases in the relative supply or declines in the
relative demand of Iraqi oil.
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In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations Security Council
imposed an embargo on exports of Iraqi oil. To alleviate the economic hardship caused
by the embargo, the UN Security Council created the Oil for Food program in 1995 that
allowed Iraq to export oil in exchange for humanitarian goods, largely food and medicine.
The proceeds from the oil exports had to be deposited in an escrow account controlled by
the UN that could only be used to purchase humanitarian supplies.
By some measures, the Oil for Food program was the largest humanitarian relief program
in world history. By the time the program ended in March 2003, the Oil for Food program had
provided $46 billion in humanitarian supplies to Iraq. This makes the Oil for Food program
more than half the size of the Marshall Plan in absolute terms, and almost six times larger
than the Marshall Plan on a per capita basis.1 There is evidence that the humanitarian
supplies provided by the program signicantly improved the standards of living of Iraq's
civilian population (especially children) during a period of severe need.2
While an important goal of the Oil for Food program was to provide humanitarian as-
sistance to Iraq, the UN Security Council was also keen to prevent the Iraqi regime from
obtaining resources that might be used to purchase weapons or luxury goods. However, de-
spite the safeguards built into the Oil for Food program, there are widespread reports that
Iraq was able to extract cash bribes and political favors from the oil buyers in the Oil for
Food program.3 Two key features of the Oil for Food program made this potentially feasible.
First, Iraq could freely choose the buyers of Iraqi oil. Second, until September 2001, Iraq
had some discretion to set the selling price of its oil. These two features of the program
potentially allowed Iraq to deliberately set the price of its oil below market prices and then
choose buyers that were willing to pay bribes to obtain the underpriced oil.
The objective of this paper is to measure these bribes. Clearly, due to its illicit nature,
nding direct evidence of the alleged cash payments and political favors { a paper trail,
for example { is dicult. A commission headed by Paul Volcker is currently investigating
mismanagement and fraud in the Oil for Food program, but has not provided evidence on
the magnitude of the alleged bribes.4 Based on documents provided by Iraq's state owned oil
1 Iraq exported $64 billion worth of oil under the Oil for Food program. Of this amount, $46 billion was
earmarked for humanitarian supplies. The Marshall Plan disbursed $11.8 billion ($84 billion in 2000 dollars)
in aid to 16 countries with a combined population of 270 million. Iraq's population is 22 million.
2 For example, during the years of the program, chronic malnutrition among children and the overall
incidence of vaccine-preventable diseases declined sharply (FAO and WFP, 2003).
3 Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, we dene the term \bribe" broadly to include cash bribes and
political favors.
4 The Volcker commission's interim report (IIC, 2005) focuses on possible con
ict of interests on the part
of UN personnel, mismanagement of UN contracts, and problems with the audits carried out by the UN
Oce of Internal Oversight Services. The report presents documentary evidence of underpricing in the case
1company, the CIA estimates that Iraq received $230-$240 million in cash bribes through the
strategic underpricing of its oil (CIA, 2004). However, the CIA's estimate does not capture
the monetary value of the political favors provided by the oil traders (or their associates) in
exchange for the underpriced oil. Moreover, it does not include bribes that might have been
paid to Iraqi ocials outside the oil company (for example, to Saddam Hussein). Therefore,
the CIA's gure may underestimate of the illegal resources Iraq was able to obtain through
its strategic underpricing. 5
We take a dierent approach. Instead of looking for documentary evidence of the alleged
bribes, we use publicly available data to uncover patterns suggestive of bribery. Specically,
we measure the magnitude of the potential bribe by the gap between the ocial selling price
of Iraqi oil (i.e. the price paid to the UN's Oil for Food Program) and our estimates of the
\market" price of Iraqi oil (i.e. the price of Iraqi oil at the destination port, typically in
Europe and the US, after subtracting shipping and insurance costs). We then compare this
gap to that observed before the program. If Iraqi oil was underpriced in an eort to collect
bribes, we expect to see two features in the data. First, we expect to see a larger gap between
the \market" price and the ocial price of Iraqi oil during the Oil for Food program years
than before the Program. In the years before the Oil for Food program, Iraq had full control
over its oil revenues and thus did not have any incentive to underprice. Second, we expect
the price dierence to become smaller and return to its historical levels after September
2001. The reason is that in September 2001, the UN changed the way in which Iraq could
price its oil. Specically, the UN adopted a \retroactive pricing" scheme under which Iraq
was forced to set its selling price retroactively based on the price actually observed in the
markets.
To illustrate our evidence, consider the gap between the ocial selling price of Basrah
Light{one of the two Iraqi oils{and the price of Arabian Light in the top panel of Figure
1. Arabian Light and Basrah Light are chemically very similar and are considered close
substitutes. The price gap averages zero in the 1980s and early 1990s, but is clearly higher
during the Oil for Food program years: the gap averages $2 in 1997 and 1998, climbs above
$5 between 2000 and 2001, and falls after that. This evidence suggests that underpricing
of Basrah Light was modest in the rst few years of the program, reached a peak in the
of one rm with alleged ties to the head of the UN Oil for Food program, but has so far not documented
the magnitude of the underpricing over the life of the program. There were more than 1,300 oil contracts
over the life the program. In Section 3, we compare our estimates of underpricing with the documentary
evidence of underpricing in the specic case analyzed in the Volcker commission's report.
5 A third reason for why the CIA's gure may be an underestimate is that, like all self-reported data on
illegal activities, the source of the data has an obvious incentive to minimize the extent of the bribes. An
alternative estimate is from the General Accounting Oce (2004), which estimates that Iraq received $859
million in cash bribes by underpricing its oil. However, this estimate is not based on any evidence on the
bribes. Rather, the GAO simply assumes that Iraq collected a 50 cent bribe on every barrel of oil.
22000-2001 period, and declined after the adoption of retroactive pricing in the fall of 2001.
Notably, we nd a qualitatively similar pattern when we measure the gap between ocial
selling price of Iraqi oil and the spot market price of Iraqi oil (after deducting shipping costs).
This gap re
ects the dierence between the price of Iraqi oil when the oil is rst sold at the
Iraqi port under UN supervision and the spot price of the same oil when it reaches its
destination and is sold to a rener in Europe or the US. The price paid to oil traders in
these spot market transactions presumably includes the cost of the bribe paid to the Iraqi
regime. The gap between this spot market price and the ocial selling price is our most
direct measure of underpricing. Unlike the evidence based on competitors, this gap can not
be explained by unobserved shocks to the relative demand or supply of Iraqi oil.
We provide corroborating evidence of our interpretation of the price gaps from changes
in the composition of Iraqi oil buyers. Specically, for the underpricing scheme to work, Iraq
has to choose oil buyers willing to pay bribes. While a major multinational oil company
might be reluctant to pay bribes, a small oil trader operating in Russia or Switzerland might
be more pliant. Therefore, if underpricing was a deliberate attempt to extract bribes, we
should see a larger fraction of oil sold to obscure oil traders during periods when underpricing
was more prevalent. Using the CIA's data (CIA 2004) on the buyers of Iraqi oil, we nd a
correlation between the degree of underpricing and the fraction of oil sold to oil individual
traders (rather than to large oil multinationals.) In particular, during the peak underpricing
period of the spring of 2001, there were no major oil company on the list of buyers.
We also test the prediction that underpricing was positively correlated with price volatil-
ity in world oil markets. Under the Oil for Food Program, Iraq set its price at least a month
in advance, and the UN had to ascertain that the price set was as close as possible to the
expected market price for the following month. It was therefore easier for the UN to prevent
Iraq from underpricing when the price of oil on the world markets was stable than when the
price of oil was very volatile. Furthermore, this relation between underpricing and volatility
presumably changed after the introduction of retroactive pricing, since retroactive pricing
eectively forced Iraq to set prices equal to the realized market price. The data support
these predictions remarkably well. In the period before retroactive pricing, we nd that
underpricing is strongly correlated with price volatility in world oil markets. By contrast,
in the period after the introduction of retroactive pricing, we nd no relationship between
underpricing and price volatility.
Based on this evidence, we interpret the product of the increase in the price gap (relative
to the price gap prior to the program) and the quantity of oil sold as an estimate of rents
generated by the strategic underpricing scheme. Our best estimate is that Iraq generated $5
billion in rents by underpricing its oil. This estimate captures both the cash bribes and the
monetary value of the favors provided by the oil traders in exchange for the underpriced oil.
3Since these rents were presumably shared between the oil buyers and the Iraqi government
(in the form of favors and cash bribes), we estimate the amount of bribes collected by Iraqi
under dierent assumptions on the split. If bribes were indeed paid only by individual
traders, and not by reputable oil companies, our estimates suggest that Iraq collected 0.7
to 2 billion dollars in bribes over the course of the Oil for Food Program, depending on the
relative bargaining power of individual traders and Iraq.6 The estimated bribes collected by
Iraq amount to 1 to 3 percent of the total value of oil sold during this period. This estimate
is not very large when compared to the typical amount of corruption that we observe in
many projects in developing countries.7
Clearly, our evidence of bribery is only indirect, and alternative interpretations are in
theory possible. First, it is possible that the documented price gaps simply re
ects an
increase in the relative supply of Iraqi oil. For example, Iraq may have actually valued the
humanitarian aid provided by the Oil for Food Program and thus chose to underprice its
oil to maximize the revenues of the Program. However, empirically we nd that episodes of
underpricing were not associated with increases in the quantity of oil sold. Since the price
elasticity of demand for Iraqi oil is likely to be fairly high, the failure to nd signicant
eects of the price gap on the quantity of oil sold suggests that this hypothesis is not valid.
Alternatively, the underpricing could be due to a decrease in the relative demand of Iraqi
oil. For example, this decrease could re
ect a deterioration of the quality of Iraqi oil, a
deterioration of Iraq's shipping facilities, or an increase in the risk of dealing with the Iraqi
regime. Again, the empirical evidence does not seem to support this possibility. If the
underpricing was due to lower quality, we would expect to see the lower quality re
ected in
the market price of Iraqi oil (which we don't). In addition, the hypothesis that underpricing
was due to the lower quality of Iraqi oil is dicult to reconcile with the quick decline in
underpricing after the adoption of retroactive pricing and with the documented relationship
between underpricing and the type of buyer.
There are several reasons why the question investigated in this paper is important. First,
the Oil for Food program was both the largest and the most high prole humanitarian
aid program ever implemented by the UN. As mentioned, there are allegations that Iraq
6 To be clear, this estimate assumes that bribes were only paid by oil traders and not by large oil
companies. Under this scenario, some of the rent was appropriated by the large oil companies in the form
of low oil prices. Obviously Iraq would prefer to deal only with individual traders willing to pay bribes.
However, it is possible that, in some periods, the supply of Iraqi oil exceeded the demand from individual
traders or that Iraq had to deal at least in part with reputable oil companies to minimize international
scrutiny.
7 Existing estimates of corruption range from 15%-18% for hospital procurements in Argentina (Di Tella
and Schargrodsky, 2003) and anti-poverty programs in Indonesia (Olken, 2004b) to 80% for Ugandan schools
(Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). We note that the 1 to 3 percent gure should be considered a lower bound,
since it is possible that Iraq was also obtaining illegal revenue by over-invoicing the humanitarian goods it
purchased through the program.
4managed to exploit the program to obtain illegal revenues. Clearly, given the seriousness of
the allegations and the implications for the UN if the allegations were true, it is important
that we provide quantitative evidence on the extent to which the program may have been
corrupted.
Second, the experience of the Oil for Food program may hold important lessons for
other humanitarian assistance programs. For example, Chad recently reached an agreement
with a consortium of oil companies led by ExxonMobil to develop its oil industry. To
prevent the oil revenues from being misused, Chad pledged that its revenues from the project
were to be deposited into an escrow account controlled by international monitors.8 The
experience of the Oil for Food program highlights the importance of institutional design in
preventing initiatives such as the ExxonMobil-Chad program from resulting in other types
of rent-seeking behavior. For example, in the case of the Oil for Food Program, a relatively
minor change in design (the introduction of retroactive pricing) appears to have dramatically
curtailed the scope for bribes.
Finally, there is growing interest among economists on rent-seeking and corruption. Our
analysis of corruption in the Oil for Food program follows the approach taken by Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2003) (on procurement fraud in public hospitals in Argentina), Fisman and
Wei (2004) (on tax evasion in China), and Reinikka and Svensson (2004) (on theft of public
education funds in Uganda) in using patterns in prices and quantities to make inferences
about corruption.9 The specic rent-seeking mechanism we examine in this paper, in which
distortions are deliberately created to extract rents, is something we see in other contexts.
For example, Banerjee et. al. (2001) describe how wealthy members of sugar cooperatives
in Maharashtra (India) set abnormally low prices for sugarcane to extract rents from the
poorer members of cooperatives, and then use the \excess" prots of the cooperatives to
nance their political activities.
There are a number of important questions we do not address in this paper. First, we only
focus on the bribes that Iraq might have been able to obtain through underpricing its oil, and
not on other mechanisms by which Iraq could have obtained illegal resources (for example,
over-invoicing the purchases of humanitarian goods). Second, there have been allegations{
currently under investigation by the Volcker Commission{that some UN employees personally
gained from the program (e.g., by intervening with the Iraqis to obtain underpriced oil for
their associates). Our evidence does not speak to this issue, although our estimates can be
used to measure the rents associated with a particular oil contract. Finally, our paper does
not measure the benets provided by the humanitarian assistance provided by the Oil for
8See www.essochad.com for additional information on this project.
9 In the same spirit, Fisman (2001) quanties the value of political connections in Indonesia, Duggan
and Levitt (2002) document match-xing in sumo wrestling, Jacob and Levitt (2003) document patterns
consistent with teacher cheating, and Olken (2004b) measures theft of subsidized rice in Indonesia.
5Food Program. Despite the corruption we document in this paper, there is evidence that
the program was successful in providing food and medicines to Iraqi civilians in a period of
acute need.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by describing the Oil for Food program and
its loopholes. We then turn to our empirical evidence in Section 3. Section 4 discusses
alternative explanations. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Oil for Food Program
The UN Security Council imposed an embargo on exports of Iraqi oil after Iraq invaded
Kuwait in 1990. To alleviate the economic hardship experienced by the Iraqi population,
the Security Council created the Oil for Food program in 1995. The rst oil sale took place
in March 1997. The revenues from the oil sales had to be deposited into an escrow account
controlled by the UN and could only be used for purposes authorized by the UN. Most of
the funds were to be used to purchase food and medicine for the Iraqi population.10 The
Oil for Food program was controlled by the members of the Security Council, meeting as
the \Sanctions Committee." The Sanctions Committee was assisted by a committee of four
technical experts, known as the oil overseers, with substantial experience in the oil industry.11
For our purposes, there are two important features of the oil for food program. First,
Iraq set the selling price for its two crude oils. The price had to be approved by the UN oil
overseers and sanctions committee. Until September 2001, the sanctions committee approved
the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil at the beginning of each month, which would apply to
all oil purchases over the month. Given the uncertainty on future market prices, it was not
always easy for the Council to determine in advance what the right price for the following
month should be. Second, Iraq was completely free to choose the buyers of its oil. As we'll
discuss later in the paper, there is some evidence that the bulk of the contracts went to oil
traders rather than to the major oil reners.
Although the intention was that the overseers would ascertain that the ocial price of oil
set by the Iraqis was set as close as possible to the market price this was not an easy task,
10 Specically, 72 percent were dedicated for food and medicine, 25 percent for a compensation fund for
victims of the rst gulf war, 2.2 percent for the Oil for Food program's administrative costs, and 0.8 percent
for the UN's weapons inspection program. The Oil for Food program initially placed some limits on how
much oil Iraq could export, but the export cap was completely lifted by December 1999. Iraq was initially
allowed to export $1 billion worth of oil every 3 months. The cap was raised to $5.2 billion every 6 months
in May 1998 and completely removed in December 1999.
11 Four overseers, from Russia, France, US, and Norway, were appointed on August 1996. However, by
June 1999, the Russian overseer was the only one of the four overseers that remained in the position after the
French, American, and Norwegian overseers resigned. The members of the Security Council did not agree
on the replacements of the three departed overseers until August 2000. Therefore, from July 1999 to August
2000, the Russian overseer was the only oil \expert" advising the Sanctions Committee.
6especially in periods when world oil markets were volatile.12 The overseers were facing two
types of uncertainty: uncertainty on future world oil prices and uncertainty on idiosyncratic
factors that might aect the relative demand of Iraqi oil (for example, changes in perceived
risks of dealing with Iraq or changes in quality of Iraqi oil). Political considerations were also
at play. According to many accounts, the Russian overseer was often inclined to approve the
price set by the Iraqi government.13
The incentive for Iraq to underprice is that when the ocial price is set below the price of
competing crude oils, this creates a windfall gain for the buyers of Iraqi oil. By underpricing,
Iraq could then demand \unocial" payments (in addition to the ocial price) from the
oil buyers. Iraq rulers could then use the \unocial" revenues to purchase weapons and
palaces, while the ocial revenues were spent on items (such as food and medicine) that
were presumably of less value to the Iraqi regime.
For this scheme to work, the buyers of underpriced Iraqi oil have to be willing to make
these illegal payments. This is where the second important feature of the oil for food program
comes in { namely, that Iraq could freely choose the buyers of its oil. This is important
because while the major oil companies might be unwilling to make these illegal payments, a
small oil trader operating in an environment with little restrictions on bribes might be more
willing to pay the bribe to obtain the oil contract. In turn, the oil trader could, after an
appropriate markup to account for the bribe paid, sell the oil contract to a major oil rener.
The rener would then send a tanker to Iraq to load the oil. The oil rener, who did not
directly pay the bribe, is happy to do this as long as the price paid to the oil trader is no
higher than the price of competing crude oils.
The way Iraqi oil was priced changed after September 2001, after rumors about possible
bribes became more widespread. In September 2001, a \retroactive" pricing scheme was
introduced, in which the buyers of Iraqi oil would know the price only after the oil had been
loaded onto the tankers. This retroactive pricing scheme made it much easier for the UN
to approve prices that were close to the actual market price. In addition, the retroactive
pricing system made it much more transparent when the UN approved prices that were
12There are no future prices for Iraq oil.
13 Maurice Lorenz, a former Exxon executive and the American overseer for the Oil for Food program in
1997 and 1998, has publicly stated that the Russian overseer constantly attempted to allow Iraqi to underprice
its oil. In a 2002 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Lorenz stated that \[he] recalls 'continually ghting'
with the Russian counterpart Alexander Kramer over the price of Iraqi oil." (Wall Street Journal, "Secret
Pipeline: How Iraq Reaps Illegal Oil Prots," by Alix Freedman and Steve Stecklow, A1, May 2, 2002.)
In 2004, Mr. Lorenz indicated that \until mid-1998 Iraq occasionally proposed somewhat low prices but
increased them under pressure from the American overseer, despite the Russian overseer's resistance but
under the threat of throwing the issue to the Sanctions Committee. The American overseer departed in 1998
and the next month Iraq's proposed prices were much further below market than any until that time. The
ex-overseer alerted the U.S. representatives on the Sanctions Committee, and these prices were increased
upon their intervention." (Wall Street Journal, "Letter to the Editor," May 6, 2004, p. A19.)
7below market prices. It is reasonable to expect that this new pricing mechanism curtailed
dramatically the scope of the bribes from the oil buyers.
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we document the extent to which Iraqi oil was underpriced when compared
to the market price of several comparison crude oils. We present four pieces of evidence.
First, in section 3.1 we compare the ocial selling price of Iraqi crude oils to the price of its
closest substitutes: Arabian Light, Arabian Medium, and Urals. Second, in Section 3.2 we
compare the ocial selling price of Iraqi crude oils with the spot market price of Iraqi crude
oil itself. Third, in section 3.3 we show that the timing and the amount of the underpricing
is associated with changes in the composition of the buyers of Iraqi oil. Fourth, in Section
3.4, we show that underpricing was higher in periods of high price volatility, and lower in
periods of price stability, at least before retroactive pricing. Finally, in section 3.5 we present
estimates of the bribes that the Iraqi regime may have obtained under dierent assumptions
on the split of the rent between buyers and Iraq. The data used are described in the Data
Appendix.
3.1 Close Competitors
We begin by comparing the price of Iraqi oils with the market prices of crude oils that
are closest substitutes to Iraqi oil. Iraq produces two types of crude oil, known as Basrah
Light and Kirkuk.14 Both crude oils are considered \light" and \sour" crudes.15 The closest
substitute of the two Iraqi oils are Arabian Light, a crude oil produced in Saudi Arabia, and
Urals, an oil produced in Russia. The physical characteristics of Arabian Light is virtually
identical to that of Basrah while Urals is considered the closest competitor to Kirkuk. The
volume of Arabian Light and Urals traded on the world oil markets are quite large and the
available data on their prices are not noisy.
The top panel in Figure 1 plots the dierence between the price of Arabian Light and
the ocial selling price of Basrah. The bottom panel shows the dierence between the
market price of Urals and the ocial selling price of Kirkuk. The rst vertical line marks
14 Basrah Light is produced from the Rumaila oil elds (around Basrah) in southern Iraq and Kirkuk is
extracted from the Kirkuk oil elds in northern Iraq. Basrah Light is typically exported from ports in the
Persian Gulf (mainly Mina-ak-Bahr) while Kirkuk is sent via pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan (on the
Mediterranean) from where it is loaded onto oil tankers.
15 \Light" crudes are easier to rene and thus command a premium over \heavier" crudes. On the other
hand, \sour" crudes have high amounts of sulfur that need to be removed during the rening process.
Therefore, sour crudes are typically sold at a discount to crude oils with lower sulfur content (called \sweet"
crudes).
8the beginning of trading under the Oil for Food Program (tenth week of 1997). The second
vertical line indicates the beginning of retroactive pricing. The horizontal line is the average
dierence for the years before the Oil for Food Program.16
As can be seen, the price gap between Basrah and Arabian Light averages zero in the
years prior to the Oil for Food program. The price gap between Kirkuk and Urals in the 1980s
is also zero. This provides some reassurance that Arabian Light and Urals are reasonably
close substitutes for the Iraqi oils. Although the dierence is by no means constant in the
years prior to the Oil for Food program, it bounces around its mean and does not show any
particular trend.
After the Oil for Food Program is introduced, this dierence is clearly larger for Basrah:
the gap averages $2 in 1997 and 1998, and climbs above $5 between 2000 and 2001. Notably,
after retroactive pricing is introduced in September 2001, the dierence drops quickly to its
historical level. (We postpone the discussion of why the price gap peaks between 2000 and
2001 to Sections 3.3 and 3.4). There is also some evidence that Kirkuk was underpriced from
2000-2001, albeit not as much as Basrah, but little evidence that it was underpriced during
the rst three years of the Oil for Food program.17
We can quantify the average price gap by estimating the following regression:
Pt =  + Programt + t (1)
where t indexes weeks, Pt is the dierence between the market price of the comparison
crude and the ocial selling price of the relevant Iraqi crude, and Programt is an indicator
variable for periods of the Oil for Food Program in which sales of Iraqi oil took place (March
1997-December 2002). The excluded category, captured by the intercept, is the period
before the Oil for Food Program (in most cases it includes years 1980-1996). The coecient
 measures the average change in the price dierence during the Program relative to the
historical baseline before the program. Because the gures indicate that the price gaps vary
signicantly between 1997 and 2002, we also estimate model that allow the gap to dier in
dierent periods:
Pt =  + 1Program1t + 2Program2t + 3Program3t + t (2)
16 No data are available between 1991 and 1993 because Iraqi oil was not traded due to the oil embargo,
the rst Gulf War and its aftermath; and in 1995-1996 due to delays in the implementation of the Oil for
Food Program.
17 We note that the documented decline in price gap after the introduction of retroactive pricing is probably
an underestimate of the true decline. The reason is that after the introduction of retroactive pricing, buyers
of Iraqi oil learn the price only after the purchase. Because of this uncertainty, we expect the demand for
Iraqi oil to decline somewhat. In other words, after retroactive pricing, Iraq has to sell its price at a discount.
Therefore the measured price for Iraqi oil is likely to be lower than the risk-adjusted price.
9where Programjt is an indicator variable for the jth sub-period of the Oil for Food
Program (for example: j = 1997-1999, 2000-2001, 2002).
One concern is that the error term t might be autocorrelated. The residual is the
dierence between shocks to Iraqi oil and shocks to its competitors. Serial correlation might
occur if the shocks to the demand and supply of Iraqi oil relative to its competitors are
serially correlated. To account for possible serial correlation we estimate models where the
error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up to ve lags and heteroskedastic (Newey
and West, 1987).18
Table 1 quanties the visual impression one gets from Figure 1 by presenting estimates of
 (from equation 1). The rst column presents the estimates of the change in the gap between
Arabian Light and Basrah. The estimate in the top panel indicates that the underpricing
averaged $2.44 dollars a barrel during the Oil for Food Program years (relative to the years
before the program).19 Because the price gaps appear to vary over time, in the bottom panel
we show separate estimates for three sub-periods (equation 2). These estimates indicate that
the price gap was signicantly dierent from zero in the 1997-1999 period, reaches a peak in
the 2000-2001 period, and declines in 2002.
An alternative competitor to Basrah Light is the Saudi crude oil Arabian Medium. While
the Arabian Light has historically been the closest substitute of Basrah light, the quality of
Basrah Light became much closer to that of Arabian Medium by the end of the program.20
For this reason, in column 2 we present a comparison based on the price of Arabian Medium.
We nd that the estimated underpricing averaged $1.24 dollars a barrel during the Oil for
Food Program years (relative to the years before the program). This estimate is smaller
than the comparison based on Arabian Light (column 1), which suggests that part of the
increase in the price gap between Arabian Light and the ocial selling price of Basrah Light
after 1997 may be due to the deteriorating quality of the Iraqi oil.
The estimate based on the comparison between Urals and Kirkuk (column 3) suggests an
average underpricing of only $0.69 dollars a barrel. This point estimate is only marginally
signicant.21
Based on the estimates of these price gaps, we can calculate the rents created by the
18 Because of the gaps in our series, we have also experimented with the Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator
for cases where the observations that are unequally spaced over time and the residual follows an AR(1)
process. Results are similar. We have also experimented with models where we cluster the standard errors
at the trimester-year level. This is not ideal, because it assumes no correlation between shocks in dierent
trimesters.
19 Specically, this is the gap from the 10th week of 1997 through the last week of 2002 relative to the 15
years prior to the program.
20 Authors' personal communication with Mr. Maurice Lorenz (American oil overseer for the Oil for Food
program from 1997-1998).
21 Estimates for models in columns 1 and 3 where the residual follows an AR(1) process based on Baltagi
and Wu (1999) are, respectively, 2.56 (0.31) and 0.70 (0.16). The estimated AR(1) parameters are 0.88 and
0.62.
10underpricing of Iraqi oil. Specically, we estimate these rents as the product of quantity sold
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where Pt is the actual price gap in a given week, ^  is the estimate of the average price
gap in the years before the Program (the intercept in equation 1), and Qt is the quantity of
the relevant Iraqi oil sold that week. This estimate indicates that the underpricing of Iraqi
oil created $3.75 billion to $6.7 billion in rents for buyers of Basrah Light (depending on
whether Arabian Light or Medium is used a comparison) and $1.8 billion in rents for buyers
of Kirkuk. These rents were presumably split between the Iraqi regime and oil buyers. Below,
we try to quantify how much of these illegal revenues went to Iraq in the form of bribes.
For completeness, we have also investigated the gap between the ocial price of the Iraqi
oils and the market price of West-Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent. WTI and Brent are
two crude oils widely used as benchmarks for the world price of oil. The patterns of the price
gap are shown in Appendix gure A1 and are generally similar to the patterns in gure 1.
Finally, we obtain similar results when we examine the price gap between Iraqi oils and four
other sour crude oils: Iranian Light, Oman, Dubai, and Venezuelan Tijuana (not shown).
3.2 Market Price of Iraqi Oil
In the previous subsection we have compared the price of Iraqi oils with the prices of its
closest substitutes. This comparison controls for changes in price of Iraqi oil that may be
driven by changes in the market's valuation of the physical quality of Iraqi oil. However, there
may be other factors (other than physical quality) that could lower the relative demand for
Iraqi oil. For example, the decline in the relative price of Iraqi oil could re
ect an increased
perceived risk of buying oil from Iraq or a higher political cost of dealing with the Hussein
regime.
To address this possibility, we turn to our second measure of the market value of Iraqi
oil: the spot market price of Iraqi oil itself. That is, we compare the ocial selling price of
Iraqi oil to the spot market price of the same oil. As explained in Section 2, oil traders that
received Iraqi oil contracts sold these contracts in spot markets in Europe and the US. The
price paid to oil traders in these spot market transactions presumably includes the cost of
the bribe paid to the Iraqi regime.
After an adjustment for transportation costs, the gap between the spot market price and
the ocial selling price should be the best measure of underpricing. Unlike the evidence
based on the other comparison oils, this price gap can not be explained by changes in the
relative demand or supply of Iraqi oil. However, the spot market data of Iraqi oil is of
11lower quality than the data on the spot market prices of the other four comparison crude
oils. In particular we have data on the spot market price of Kirkuk and Basrah from three
independent sources.22 But no data source covers the entire period. To construct a series
for the spot market price of the two Iraqi crude oils over the entire time period, we simply
take the average of the price gaps from the data sources available in each week.
Figure 2 shows the price dierence between the market price of Iraqi crude and its own
ocial selling price. The top panel is for Basrah. As can be seen, the overall picture
is qualitatively similar to Figure 1. The gure suggests that underpricing was somewhat
limited from 1997-1999, large from 2000-2001, and declined after September 2001. The
bottom panel is for Kirkuk. The graph is noisier than the previous gures, and the evidence
for underpricing for Kirkuk appears therefore weaker than that for Basrah. We do not know
exactly why the documented price gap appears to be larger for Basrah than for Kirkuk.23
Table 2 quanties the magnitude of the price gap. Looking at the overall estimates,
the point estimates are 1.64 and 0.29 for Basrah and Kirkuk, respectively. The estimate
for Basrah is remarkably close to the estimate based on the comparison between Arabian
Medium and Basrah (column 2 Table 1), while the estimate for Kirkuk is lower than the
previous estimate.24
Estimates by period show a pattern similar to the one shown in Table 1, with the peak
of the underpricing reached in the 2000-2001 period. Although the patterns over time are
generally similar, it appears that the ndings in column 1 and 3 of Table 1 may be an
overestimate of the true magnitude of the price gap. However, the estimate of underpricing
based on the comparison of Basrah Light with Arabian Medium is remarkably similar to
the estimate obtained from the spot market price of Basrah Light. Estimates of the illegal
revenues are $4.96 billion and $1.14 billion, respectively.
Our estimates of underpricing match fairly well the only existing piece of documentary
evidence of underpricing. This documentary evidence is from a report by the commission
headed by Paul Volcker, and refers to ve purchases of Kirkuk crude oil (for a total of
7.3 million barrels) by an oil trading company called the Africa Middle East Petroleum
Company (AMEP). Based on written documentation on the price paid by AMEP to Iraq
and on the price received by AMEP on the spot market by reners (mostly by Shell), the
Volcker commission calculates that Kirkuk was underpriced by an average of $.25 in these
ve cases (IIC, 2005). Our estimates based on the comparison between the OSP price for
22 Our three sources are ICISLOR, Platts, and Petroleum Argus. See the Data Appendix for more details.
23 We note, however, that the traded quantity of Basrah is larger than the traded quantity of Kirkuk.
This dierence may explain, at least in part, the fact that the series for Kirkuk is noisier.
24 Clustered standard errors are respectively .28 and .15. Estimates for models where the residual follows
an AR(1) process are, respectively, 1.79 (.27) and .27 (.14). The estimated AR(1) parameters are .78 and
.54.
12Kirkuk and the market price for Kirkuk in the ve three-week windows centered around the
date of the AMEP sales is $.27, which is remarkably consistent with the evidence provided
by the Volcker commission.
It is worth noting that the estimated underpricing in the AMEP contracts appears to be
low. There are two reasons for this. First, the underpricing involves Kirkuk, and we have
shown that underpricing was much less prevalent with Kirkuk than with Basrah. Second,
three of the sales are from the 1998-1999 period, where underpricing was generally low. For
this reason, the specic case examined in detail by the Volcker commission does not appear
to be representative of the underpricing during the life of the Program. More generally,
there were 1,300 oil contracts during the Oil for Food program, and it would seem to be
prohibitively costly to compile the same type of documentary evidence provided by the
Volcker commission for the AMEP oil sales for all 1,300 contracts. In this context, our
estimates can be used to focus valuable investigative resources. Specically, our estimates
of underpricing suggest that the bulk of the underpriced contracts involved Basrah between
May 2000 and September 2001, and it is these contracts that investigators should focus on.
3.3 Underpricing and the Composition of Oil Buyers
So far we have found consistent evidence that Basrah Light was modestly underpriced
from 1997-1999 and signicantly underpriced from 2000-2001. Here we show that the peak
of illegal revenues happens at the time when the importance of major oil companies as a
fraction of Iraqi oil buyers is the lowest. Although this evidence is clearly only suggestive,
it is consistent with the rest of the evidence presented so far.
If the underpricing of Basrah Light was a deliberate attempt to extract bribes from the
oil buyers, it obviously must be the case that the buyers are willing to pay these bribes. It
is possible, and indeed likely, that not all the buyers are willing to pay bribes. There were
three types of buyers of Iraqi oil. First, there were major multinational oil companies that
operate in Iraq as well as in many other oil markets. Examples include Shell, BP, Total
(France), Agip (Italy), and Gasprom (Russia). On the other extreme, there were many
individual dealers with no connection to reputable companies. These dealers were typically
from countries such as Russia, Ukraine, or Switzerland, that are not major oil importers.
Third, there were small but legitimate oil companies (not major multinationals).25
We expect that, while a major multinational oil company might nd it dicult to pay
bribes, a small oil trader operating in Russia or Switzerland might be more willing to do
so. Therefore, if greater underpricing was in fact associated with greater bribes, we should
see a larger fraction of oil sold to obscure oil traders during periods when underpricing was
25 This group also include few cases where the buyer was a government organization.
13more prevalent.26 Finding that during periods of high underpricing most of Iraqi oil was in
fact bought by reputable multinational companies like Shell or BP would cast doubt on the
proposed link between underpricing and bribes.
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for the composition of buyers of Iraqi oil. The
evidence on buyers is based on data provided in the publicly released report of the CIA's Iraq
Survey Group, also known as the Duelfer's report (CIA 2004), which lists the buyers of Iraqi
oil in each 3-6 months period.27 The number of buyers tend to increases over time, while
the average size of a each contract declines after 1998. The number of major oil companies
reaches a nadir in 2001, while the number of individual buyers generally increases. The
bottom part of the table shows the top ve countries of origin of the buyers. As can be seen,
the largest number of contracts went to Russian traders.
Figure 3 presents the evidence on the relation between the composition of buyers of Iraqi
oil and the extent of underpricing. The top panel shows the estimated total amount of
illegal revenues, by period. The total amount of illegal revenues is obtained using estimates
of equation 3 based on the comparison of the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil and its market
price. The gure indicates that most of the illegal revenues were obtained between 2000 and
2001.
The middle panel presents the fraction of buyers of Iraqi oil that are individual traders
(as opposed to corporations, both major and minor ). This fraction is low in the years before
2000, and grows with time. It reaches a peak in the rst trimester of 2001, and declines after
that. A comparison with the top panel indicates that the rst trimester of 2001 is exactly
the time when underpricing of Basrah reached its peak. The correlation between the degree
of underpricing and the fraction of buyers that are individuals is .48.
The bottom panel presents similar evidence based on an alternative classication of Iraqi
oil buyers. Specically, it shows what fraction of buyers of Iraqi oil that are major oil
companies. We dene major oil companies as the ones listed among the top 200 oil companies
in the world.28 (Not all the companies are major oil companies, so that the fraction of major
oil companies is not 1 minus the fraction of individual traders.) Again, there appears to
be a relationship between underpricing and the share of major oil companies among the oil
buyers. A large fraction of buyers are major oil companies in the earlier years of the program
when underpricing was less prevalent. The share of major oil companies decline over time.
Notably, there are no major oil companies among the oil buyers in the rst trimester of 2001,
which is exactly when underpricing reached its peak. The correlation between underpricing
26 The likelihood that the third type of buyers was willing to pay bribes is probably in between the
likelihood for the rst and the second type.
27 The Oil for Food program had to be renewed by the Security Council every 3-6 months.
28 As dened by Forbes. (http://www.forbes.com/2004/03/24/04f2000land.html)
14and the fraction of buyers that are major oil corporations is -.42.29
3.4 The Relationship Between Underpricing and Price Volatility
In this subsection, we propose a second specication check based on the relationship
between underpricing and price volatility in the crude oil world markets. Until the adoption
of retroactive pricing, Iraq could set the price of its oil, but the price had to be approved by
the UN (see Section 2). In particular, each month, Iraq set the price of its oil for transactions
that would take place the following month and the UN ascertained that the price set was
as close as possible to the expected market price for the following month. Since there are no
future prices for Iraq oil, this was not an easy task for the UN overseers, especially in periods
when world oil markets were volatile. When the price of oil on the world markets was stable,
predicting the future price of oil was relatively easy. However, in periods when the price of
oil was very volatile, predicting the future price of oil became much harder. This suggests
that it should have been easier for Iraq to get away with a low price in periods characterized
by high volatility in world oil prices. It was harder for the UN overseers to object to a
low price in periods were the future price of oil was very uncertain. This relation between
underpricing and volatility presumably changed after the introduction of retroactive pricing,
since retroactive pricing eectively forced Iraq to set prices equal to the actual market price,
irrespective of volatility.
If this is true, we should observed two features in the data. First, in the period before
the introduction of retroactive pricing, we should see that our estimates of underpricing are
higher in weeks of high oil price volatility. Second, in the period after the introduction of
retroactive pricing, we should see that our estimates of underpricing are not correlated with
volatility. Finding a correlation between underpricing and volatility after the adoption of
retroactive pricing would cast doubt on the validity of the interpretation of this specication
test.
Table 4 shows estimate from four regressions of underpricing on market volatility. Because
the UN overseers used the price of Brent (a widely used international benchmark price) as a
reference points for shipments going to Europe, we measure volatility on the world oil market
as the standard deviation of the price of Brent in the ten weeks preceding the observed
transaction.30 (Note that the dependent variable is of course a price dierence, while the
dependent variable is volatility in the price level.)
29 In theory, another possible specication check would be to test the relationship between underpricing
and penalties for paying bribes. For example, it is illegal for US executives operating abroad to pay bribes.
We should see smaller underpricing when the buyers are from countries where it is illegal for executives
operating abroad to pay bribes. Unfortunately, there is not much variation in this dimension. Most of the
oil contracts go to countries where there are no penalties. Few contracts are awarded to American companies.
30 Using 5 weeks does not signicantly change the results.
15The table shows a pattern that matches remarkably well our predictions. In the period
before retroactive pricing (September 2001), there is a positive association between our
estimates of underpricing and volatility, both for Basrah and Kirkuk. To have a sense of the
magnitude of the coecient, consider that a move from the 25th percentile of the standard
deviation distribution to the 75th percentile (i.e. from a standard deviation of 0.89 to one
of 1.77) would be associated with an increase in underpricing equal to $0.80 for Basrah
and $0.26 for Kirkuk. Such an eect seems quantitatively large, especially for Basrah.
Notably, after retroactive pricing is introduced, the correlation between underpricing and
volatility disappears. The coecients in the second row for both Basrah and Kirkuk are not
statistically dierent from zero.
Overall, it appears that it was easier for Iraq to underprice its oil in period of high
price volatility than in periods of price stability. This nding is interesting for two reasons.
First, it lends further credibility to the interpretation of our results. Second, it is useful in
explaining the timing of the documented underpricing. Our evidence suggests that the peak
underpricing period began in the spring of 2000 and ended by September 2001. It seems clear
that the end of underpricing was due to the adoption of the retroactive pricing scheme in
September 2001 by the British and American representatives on the Security Council. The
question that remains, however, is why was Iraq able to dramatically expand its underpricing
in the spring of 2000? The evidence on the link between volatility and underpricing suggests
that part of the answer may lie with the increased volatility of the price of oil in world
markets. The months of peak underpricing (2000 and the rst half of 2001) are month
characterized by high volatility in the price of oil markets. By contrast, volatility was much
lower in 1997, 1998 and 1999.
3.5 Estimating the Total Amount of Bribes to Iraq
We have presented evidence that there seems to have been signicant underpricing of
Iraqi oil (especially of Basrah) and that this underpricing increases when the fraction of
contracts awarded to major oil companies is small. Here we aim to quantify the amount of
bribes that the Iraqi government may have received from this underpricing mechanism.
In the top panel of Figure 3 we have shown the total amount of illegal revenues based on
our estimates, by period. Of course, not all this revenue ends up in Iraqi coers. Presumably,
the buyers (at least some of them) demand a share of the illegal revenues. If one knew that
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where 
t is the fraction of the relevant oil in week t that was bought by buyers willing
16to pay bribes and  is the intermediaries' cut. The intermediaries' cut  depends on (1) the
bargaining power of intermediaries relative to that of Iraq; (2) the cost of reselling the oil; and
(3) the expected penalty that a buyer caught paying bribes may face. In turn, the relative
bargaining power of buyers depends of the elasticity of supply of buyers. For example,  will
be smaller if there is a large number of potential buyers than if there is a limited number of
potential buyers, holding constant the cost of reselling the oil and the expected penalty. In
the extreme case where there is an innite number of potential buyers, the reselling cost is
zero and the expected penalty is zero,  should be zero. In a more realistic case, where the
number of potential buyers is less than innite, and the reselling cost is positive,  should be
larger than 0, but less than 1. We have no information on the intermediary's cut. Because
of this, we simply provide alternative estimates of B under dierent assumption on the size
of . We have relatively more information on 
t, because we know who the buyers are (see
Section 3.3).
In Table 5 we present estimates of equation 4. Entries in column 1 are obtained by
taking a fraction of the product of the amount of the relevant Iraqi oil sold in each week
between 1997 and 2002 by the dierence between the price dierence observed in each week
between 1997 and 2002 and the average price dierence for the period 1980-1995. The price
dierences are between the market price of Iraqi oil and the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil
(Table 2). For example, the rst entry in column 1 is obtained by taking 75% of the sum
of the two entries in the bottom row in Table 2. In terms of equation 4, the entry in the
rst column and rst row assumes that  = :25 and 
 = 1. The second and third entry in
column 1 are obtained by taking 50% and 25% of the sum of the two entries in the bottom
row in Table 2, respectively ( = .5 and  = .75).
Based on the entries in columns 1, if the dealers' cut was 25%, the total amount of bribes
obtained by Iraq would be $4.5 billion. If the dealers' cut was 50%, the bribes would amount
to $3.0 billion. If the dealers' cut was 75%, the total amount of bribes would be $1.5 billion.
However, not all buyers may have been willing to pay bribes. As we argue above, major
oil companies may be concerned about their reputation and may nd it dicult to pay
bribes. Entries in column 2 show estimates of the amount of bribes obtained by Iraq under
the assumption that only individual traders not aliated with oil companies are willing to
pay bribes. Those entries are obtained by applying equation 4, where 
t is estimated as 1
minus the fraction of buyers who are individual traders in the relevant period of the Oil for
Food Program.31 Note that under this scenario, the major oil companies that were allocated
contracts for underpriced Iraqi oil get to keep the entire rent. Individual traders, on the
other hand, would buy Iraqi oil below market price, resell it at market price, but would
have to split the rent with the Iraqi regime. Obviously the Iraqi regime would prefer to deal
31 Our proxy for 
t does not vary at the weekly level, but for each six month interval.
17only with individual traders. But it is possible that, in some periods, the supply of Iraqi oil
exceeded the demand from traders that were willing to pay bribes to purchase underpriced
oil. Alternatively, it is possible that Iraq felt compelled to deal at least in part with reputable
oil companies to minimize international scrutiny.
Based on the estimates in columns 2, the total amount of bribes obtained by Iraq would
be between $0.7 billion and $2.1 billion, depending on the dealers' cut.
Column 2 provides our best estimate of the bribes obtained by Iraq. The estimated bribes
amount to 1 to 3% of the total value of oil sales during the Oil for Food Program. Compared
to the amount of corruption typically observed in projects in some developing countries, a 1
to 3% of funds lost to corruption does not appear to be particularly large.32 However, it is
possible that there were other irregularities in the Oil for Food Program that allowed Iraq
to siphon funds from the program. For example, it is possible that over-billing took place
in the purchase of humanitarian goods. We do not measure this in this paper, as we do not
have a tractable way of measuring its magnitude. For this reason, the 1 to 3% gure should
be interpreted as a lower bound.
How do our estimates of the total amount of bribes in column 2 compare with the two
existing estimates? The GAO (2004) estimates that Iraq obtained almost $900 million in
bribes while the CIA's (2004) estimates are smaller, ranging from $230 to $240 million. As
we've mentioned, the GAO's estimate is not based on any evidence, but simply assumes
that Iraq collected a 50 cent bribe on every barrel of oil. On the other hand, the CIA's
estimates are presumably more reliable, as they are based on documentation provided by
Iraq's state owned oil company on the cash bribes paid by the oil buyers. However, there are
several reasons to believe that the CIA's data might understate the amount of the illegal cash
payments. First, bribes may have also been paid to other branches of the Iraqi government
(other than the oil company) and to Iraqi ocials on a personal basis. The CIA estimate
would miss these bribes. Second, the source of the CIA's data { Iraq's oil company { has an
obvious incentive to minimize the extent of the bribes. This is a common problem with all
self-reported data on illegal activities.
More importantly, it is possible that some of recipients of the oil contracts (or their
associates) compensated Iraq with political favors instead of monetary bribes. For example,
a central accusation of the Volcker commission (IIC, 2005) is that head of the Oil for Food
program, Mr. Benon Sevan, intervened with the Iraqis to obtain oil allocations for Africa
32 For example, Olken (2004a) nds that 29% of funds allocated to to a road building project in Indonesia
were stolen. In another program in Indonesia, Olken (2004b) nds that 18% of subsidized rice in a large
anti-poverty program in Indonesia is stolen. A study of hospital procurement in Argentina nds a 15%
overcharging for inputs (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003). A study of Uganda schools nds that 80% of the
funds allocated by the Ministry of Education for schools never reached the schools (Reinikka and Svensson,
2004).
18Middle East Petroleum Company (AMEP). In exchange, the Iraqis wanted Mr. Sevan's
assistance in getting permission to use the Oil for Food program funds to purchase oil-
industry equipment. If Iraq was compensated by some buyers in the form of political favors
(rather than by monetary bribes), the CIA's estimate would understate the degree by which
Iraqi oil was underpriced and, by extension, the illegal resources that Iraq might have been
able to obtain through this scheme.
In fact, the Volcker commission reports that of the ve transactions involving AMEP, a
cash bribe (about 18 cents a barrel) was paid in only one of the ve transactions. Thus,
the documentary evidence indicates that AMEP paid an average cash bribe of 2.5 cents a
barrel for the 7.3 million barrels of Kirkuk crude oil purchased from Iraq, which is roughly
a tenth of the extent by which Kirkuk was underpriced in the AMEP transactions (25 cents
a barrel).33 In contrast, we remind the reader that our estimates are remarkably consistent
with the Volcker commission's documentary evidence of underpricing in the AMEP oil sales.
Therefore, our estimates based on the price gap are arguably an accurate measure of the
sum of the monetary bribes and the monetary value of the political favors that Iraq obtained
through the deliberate underpricing of its oil.
4 Alternative Explanations
We have interpreted the documented underpricing as a deliberate attempt by Iraq to
extract bribes from the oil buyers. It is useful to visualize this argument in terms of the
supply and demand for Iraqi oil. Specically, suppose that S represent the supply of Iraqi oil,
D the demand for Iraqi oil from the end-users (e.g., oil reners), and the equilibrium price
and quantity of Iraqi oil is given by P1 and Q1 (Figure 4). Now, suppose that, in exchange
for a bribe, Iraq sells the oil to traders at a below-market price (P2). In turn, the trader
resells the oil to reners in spot markets at the market price P1. Since the underpricing
does not aect the nal price paid by the end users of Iraqi oil, there is no change in the
equilibrium quantity of Iraqi oil. The underpricing creates a rent, given by the shaded area in
Figure 4, which is presumably split between Iraq (in the form of bribes) and the oil traders.
This interpretation of the price gap assumes that there were no contemporaneous changes
in the relative supply or relative demand for Iraqi oils. In this section, we discuss the validity
of this assumption. Specically, we discuss the possibility that underpricing of Iraqi oil was
driven by an increase in relative supply or a decrease in relative demand.
Increase in Supply: An alternative interpretation of the evidence on underpricing is
33 The illegal cash payment of 18 cents a barrel involved the sale of 1 million barrels of oil, or 13.6 percent
of the total Iraqi sales to AMEP.
19that the underpricing was a deliberate eort by the Iraqi regime to sell more oil. Why
might Iraq want to do this? One possible explanation is that the UN oil embargo decreased
standards of living in Iraq. Assuming that this decline aected the Iraqi elite as well as the
average Iraqi, this can be interpreted as an increase in the marginal utility of consumption.
If Iraq is trying to decide how much oil to produce today and how much to save for future
consumption, an increase in the marginal utility of consumption should generate an increase
in current production and therefore, assuming that Iraq faces a downward sloping demand
curve for its oil, a decline in price.34 Of course, the magnitude of the price decline would
depend on the elasticity of demand for Iraqi oil. The higher the elasticity, the smaller is the
price change.
This hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 4 by a shift in the supply curve from S to S'
(assuming that the demand and supply of Iraqi competitors remain unchanged.) The equi-
librium shifts from point 1 to point 2. The increase in supply lowers the market price from
P1 to P2 and increases the quantity of oil sold from Q1 to Q2. Note that if one can not
observe the exact location of the supply curve, one could attribute the price drop P1 to P2
to illegal underpricing, while in fact it is caused by a standard increase in supply.
Several pieces of evidence argue against this hypothesis. First, if the only explanation
for the documented underpricing was an increase in the supply of Iraqi oil relative to its
competitors, we should not see underpricing when we compare the market price of Iraqi oil
to its own ocial selling price. However, we nd evidence of underpricing even when we
measure the gap between the market price of Iraqi oil and its ocial selling price.
Second, although it is probably less than innite, the demand faced by Iraq is likely to be
very elastic. After all, even if crude oil is not perfectly homogeneous, it is a commodity.35 If
the demand curve for Iraqi oil is elastic, the large price dierences documented in the previous
section (more than $1 on average, with peaks of up to $4) would imply enormous increases
in quantity sold. However, we simply do not observe such large variations in quantity sold.
Figure 5 presents a scatter-plot of the price gap and the quantity sold of Basrah (top panel)
and Kirkuk (bottom panel). If the episodes of underpricing were triggered by an outward
shift in the relative supply of Iraqi oil, we should see a positive relationship between the price
gap and the quantity. However, the relationship between the price dierence and quantity
34 We have in mind a stylized two-period model of optimal oil extraction. Suppose that Iraq has to decide
how much of its nite oil reserves it wants to extract today. The marginal benet of extracting oil today is the
product of the marginal utility of consumption today and the gap between marginal revenues and marginal
costs. In turn, the marginal loss from extracting oil today is the cost of forgone future consumption, which is
the product of the discounted marginal utility of consumption tomorrow and the dierence between marginal
revenue and costs tomorrow. The equilibrium quantity of Iraqi oil is where marginal benet equals marginal
loss. A more formal treatment is available on request.
35 While dierent types of oils have dierent chemical characteristics, and dierent reners have preferences
for some types of oil over others, these dierences are second order, and reners can adjust their rening
processes to deal with dierent crudes.
20is either not statistically dierent from zero or negative. 36
In sum, this evidence is not consistent with a story where the Iraqi government was
trying to sell a lot of oil, especially if the elasticity of demand for Iraqi oil is high. How
elastic is the price elasticity of demand for Iraqi oil? To answer this question, we need an
exogenous change in the supply of Iraqi oil. One such exogenous supply shift is the doubling
of the export cap of Iraqi oil in mid 1998. Specically, starting in Phase 4 of the Oil for
Food Program (May 30, 1998), the cap on Iraq's exports of oil was doubled from $1 billion
every 3 months to $5.2 billion every six months. As a consequence, the volume of oil exports
increased from 182 million barrels in phase 3 (December 5, 1997 to May 29, 1998) to 308
million barrels in phase 4 (May 30, 1998 to November 25, 1998).37
The top panel of Figure 6 shows the amount of oil produced by Iraq and its price before
and after the increase in production allowed by the UN. 38 The vertical line denotes the
exogenous change in quantity sold between phase 3 and phase 4. The top panel indicates
that the large supply increase resulted in a modest price decline in ocial selling price in
the period that immediately followed the supply increase. This decline was reversed in the
following period. The lack of substantial decrease in price is consistent with a demand
curve that is very elastic but not perfectly horizontal. Because many other things may
have changed in the oil market in that period, the bottom panel reports the price dierence
between Iraqi competitors and Iraqi oils, instead of the price of Iraqi oil.39 In the period that
immediately follows the supply increase, the price of Iraqi oil declines somewhat relative to
the price of its competitors. This eect is short lived, and in the next period this relative
decline is reversed. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the notion that the price elasticity
of demand for Iraqi oil is relatively high. This evidence, combined with the absence of a
positive relationship between quantity and the price gap, suggests that the underpricing was
not driven by an increase in the relative supply of Iraqi oil.
Quality Dierences and Relative Demand Shifts A second alternative explanation
is that the price gap re
ects a shift in the relative demand for Iraqi oil. Recall that our
econometric models in Table 1 control for a baseline dierence in the demand of Iraqi oil
and the relevant comparison oil. This baseline dierence accounts for permanent dierences
36 A regression of quantity sold on the price gap yields a coecient (std error) of -2.17 (4.00) for Basrah
and -8.61 (4.34) for Kirkuk. It is in theory possible that these coecients are biased, if unobserved shocks
to the demand of Iraqi oil are systematically correlated with changes in its supply.
37 The quantity cap was completely lifted in 1999.
38 The level of observation here is each six month phase of the Oil for Food Program. For this period,
separate data on the production of Basrah and Kirkuk are not separately available. The amount of oil sold
is therefore the sum of Basrah and Kirkuk and the price is the average of the two Iraqi oils.
39 The price dierence is the dierence between a weighted average of the price of Arabian Light and Urals
minus the price of Iraqi oil, with weights re
ecting the average share of production of Basrah and Kirkuk in
the period where separate information on the quantity sold of Basrah and Kirkuk is separately available.
21in demand, but this obviously leaves open the possibility that the relative demand for Iraqi
oil fell during the Oil for Food program years.
Why would the relative demand for Iraqi oil fall? First, it might be possible that the
quality of Iraqi oil (relative to the quality of its close substitutes) fell in the years after the
rst Gulf War.40 Alternatively, it is possible that the physical quality of Iraqi oil may not
have changed, but that the quality of Iraq's shipping facilities may have declined. A related
explanation is that the political costs of buying Iraqi oil may have increased after the rst
Gulf War.
All three factors would represent a fall in the demand for Iraqi oil. This can be viewed
as a leftward shift in the demand curve for Iraqi oil from D to D' in Figure 4, and a fall in
the equilibrium price and quantity to P2 and Q3, respectively. As we mentioned before, if
we can not observe the exact location of the demand curve, we could attribute the decline
in price to illegal underpricing, while in fact it is caused by a simple decline in demand.
However, this story is not consistent with three pieces of evidence. First, the price gap
between Iraqi oil and other oils drops to zero after the introduction of retroactive pricing.
There is no reason to believe that quality dierences or risk dierences{if they ever existed{
ended abruptly in September 2001. Second, and most importantly, the change in relative
demand story is not consistent with Figure 2 and Table 2, which show a gap between the
market price of Iraqi oil and its own ocial selling price. Third, this hypothesis would not
explain the relationship between underpricing and fraction of buyers who are not major oil
companies.
Overall, we conclude that in most of the period under consideration, changes in the
relative demand, if they took place, were not driving the price gaps documented.41
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we nd modest evidence that the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil was
below its market value from 1997 through 1999, but clear evidence of underpricing from
40 As we mention above, we suspect that this possibility is not very likely, since Arabian Light and
Arabian Medium have chemical characteristics very similar to Basrah and the physical quality of Urals is
almost identical to that of Kirkuk.
41 A third possible explanation is represented by technological dierences. While there are no reasons
to think that Iraqi oil extraction and shipping technologies were dierent from its competitors in 1991 just
before the rst Gulf War, it is likely that such dierence existed after 1997. Years of embargo are likely to
have aected Iraqi access to new technologies and to spare parts necessary to keep its production facilities up
to date. Could this technological gap explain the underpricing documented in the previous section? It seems
unlikely. Two scenario are possible, depending on the elasticity of demand. If elasticity of demand is innite,
we should see a decline in oil production but no change in prices. The reason is that at a given world price,
some marginal elds become not protable. In this scenario, prices are not aected, while quantity declines.
If elasticity of demand is not innite, both quantity and prices are aected. But a decline in extraction
technology will result in an increase in Iraqi prices, not a decrease.
22May 2000 through September 2001. In addition, there is little evidence of underpricing after
September 2001, when the UN introduced a retroactive pricing scheme that made it more
dicult for Iraq to underprice. Moreover, we nd a suggestive relationship between the
degree of underpricing and the composition of the buyers of Iraqi oil. Specically, we nd
that periods of underpricing were periods in which a larger share of the oil was purchased by
obscure oil traders rather than by multinational oil companies. The peak of the underpricing
occurred at a time when no major multinational companies appear among the buyers. We
also nd that it was easier for Iraq to underprice its oil in periods of high price volatility
in world oil markets. This is expected, as detection of underpricing by the UN is more
dicult in periods of high volatility. As expected, the relationship between underpricing
and volatility disappears after the adoption of retroactive pricing.
Why did Iraq sell its oil below market price? We hypothesize that underpricing was a
way for the Iraq regime to obtain illegal kickbacks or political favors from the oil buyers.
Because all the legal oil revenues were controlled by the UN, the Iraq regime had an incentive
to sell its oil below its market price in exchange for a bribe from the buyer. Our estimates
suggest that Iraq created 5 billion dollars in rents by underpricing the oil. Depending on
the assumptions one makes about the split of this rent between Iraq and the oil traders,
we estimate that Iraqi illegally received 0.7 to 2 billion dollars in bribes between 1997 and
2002.42 This estimate should be interpreted as the sum of the direct cash payments and the
monetary value of the political favors provided by the oil buyers.
We want to be clear on two points. First, in addition to underpricing its oil, there are
other mechanisms that Iraq could have employed to obtain illegal resources. For example,
it could very well be the case that Iraq was also obtaining illegal revenue by over-invoicing
the humanitarian goods it purchased through the Oil for Food program. We focus on illicit
income from oil sales, rather than on illegal revenue from other sources, because we have a
tractable way of measuring the the bribes Iraq might have been able to extract from the oil
buyers.
Second, we clearly can not say that the Oil for Food program was a failure. Although we
nd suggestive evidence that during certain periods of time, particularly from 2000-2001, the
Oil for Food program was corrupted by Iraq's eorts to extract bribes, it is entirely possible
that the program provided valuable aid that signicantly alleviated the humanitarian crisis in
Iraq. Furthermore, underpricing declined after a retroactive pricing scheme was put in place
by the UN in 2001. Therefore, it appears that incentives do matter, and careful institutional
design on the part of international development agencies is crucial to minimize the amount
of theft and waste in humanitarian programs.
42 We reminder the reader that 0.7 to 2 billion dollars is roughly 1 to 3 percent of the oil sales under the
Oil for Food program.
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24Data Appendix
Every month, Iraq (with the approval of the UN's oil overseers) sets the ocial selling
price of Basrah Light and Kirkuk. The quoted prices are \free on board" (fob) prices for
loadings in Ceyhan in Turkey (Kirkuk) or at Mina-ak-Bahr in the Persian Gulf (Basrah
Light). The ocial selling price also diers according to the intended destination of the oil
(US, Europe, or Asia). 43 Starting in September 1998, the UN reports the it average ocial
selling price of Iraqi crude oil each week.44 However, the UN does not provide information
on the individual prices of the two Iraqi crude oils, nor does it provide the fob prices for the
dierent markets. For this reason, we obtained the ocial selling price of the two Iraqi crude
oils (Basrah Light and Kirkuk) from Platts.45 Because Basrah Light is typically exported
to the US, we take the ocial selling price for Basrah Light destined for the US. In turn,
Kirkuk is largely exported to Europe, so we take the ocial selling price of Kirkuk destined
for European markets.
We compare the ocial selling price of Iraqi oil with the market price of Arabian Light
and Arabian Medium (Saudi Arabia) and Urals (Russia). The oil industry press frequently
cites \Arab Light", a crude oil produced by Saudi Arabia, as the closest substitute for Basrah
Light46 In turn, a Russian crude oil known as \Urals" is widely viewed as a close substitute
of Kirkuk. We dene the price of the two Saudi crude oils as the fob price in the Persian
Gulf (from ICIS-LOR, obtained from Datastream's database). In turn, the market price of
Urals is typically quoted as a delivered (or cif) price in Italy (also from ICIS-LOR, provided
through Datastream). We convert the delivered price of Urals in Italy to a fob price by
subtracting oil tanker rates from the Black Sea to Italy47
Turning to the market price of the Iraqi oils, we combine data from three sources to
obtain the spot market price of Basrah Light and Kirkuk. These three sources are ICIS-
LOR, Platts, and Petroleum Argus.48 For Kirkuk, the data provided by all three sources are
spot fob prices for loadings at the port of Ceyhan (in Turkey.) For Basrah Light, ICIS-LOR
and Petroleum Argus reports the cif price at the US Gulf Coast. We convert the cif price
to a fob price by subtracting the shipping rates for crude oil from the Persian Gulf to the
US Gulf Coast.49 Platts also reports the cif price of Basrah Light in the US Gulf Coast, but
43 Specically, the ocial price is quoted as a discount to the benchmark crude oil in each region (Brent in
Europe, West-Texas Intermediate in the US, and Oman and Dubai in Asia). Specically, the Iraq's ocial
selling price is quoted as a discount to dated Brent for oil shipped to European markets, as a discount to
West Texas Intermediate for shipments to the US, and as a discount to an average of Oman and Dubai for
exports to Asia.
44 Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/oip .
45 We purchased this data from Platts. There are no price data is 1995 and 1996, because no trading took
place. The data from the UN match reasonably well the properly weighted data from Platts for the years
when both sources are available (mid 1998-2002).
46 The technical characteristics of Basrah Light and Arab Light are very similar. The two crude oils have
identical weights (at 33 percent API), while Arab Light has a slightly lower sulfur content (1.8 percent) than
Basrah Light (2 percent.)
47 For the years 1991-2002, we weekly shipping data from Bloomberg. Unfortunately the Bloomberg series
is not available prior to 1991. For the years 1987-1990, we use the monthly series from the annual issues of
OPEC's Statistical Bulletin (OPEC). We could not nd monthly level data for 1985 and 1986. We impute
transportation costs in 1985 and 1986 based on the mean transportation cost observed between 1987 and
1990.
48 The data from Petroleum Argus is obtained from weekly issues of \Petroleum Argus Weekly Global
Markets." We obtained Platts data on spot prices of the Iraqi crudes from OPEC's annual statistical bulletin
and weekly issues of the Energy Information Administration's \Weekly Petroleum Status Report." Finally,
we purchased data on the spot prices of the two Iraqi oils from ICIS-LOR.
49 We obtained weekly series on shipping costs from the Persian Gulf to the US Gulf Coast from Bloomberg.our sources that report Platts' data already adjust the cif price for shipping costs from the
Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, no individual source for spot prices covers the entire period.
To construct a series for the spot market price of the two Iraqi crude oils over the entire time
period, we take the average of the price gaps from the data sources available in each week.
We choose a simple average as the most transparent way of combining the three alternative
series.
Finally, the website of the UN Oil for Food program reports the weekly quantity of oil
sold. Starting in mid-1998, this data is reported separately for exports through Ceyhan
(Turkey) and Mina-ak-Bahr (on the Persian Gulf) for most weeks, but there are many weeks
in which this breakdown is not provided publicly.Table 1: Dierence Between the Market Price of Close Competitors and the ocial selling Price of Iraqi Oils
Arabian Light Arabian Medium Urals
- Basrah - Basrah - Kirkuk
(1) (2) (3)
Model 1: Overall Estimates
Dierence for 1997-2002 - Dierence for 1980-1995 2.44** 1.24** 0.69**
(0.25) (0.34) (0.18)
Model 2: Estimates by Period
Dierence for 1997-1999 - Dierence for 1980-1995 2.07** 0.84** 0.53**
(0.18) (0.24) (0.15)
Dierence for 2000-2001 - Dierence for 1980-1995 3.91** 2.67** 1.07**
(0.41) (0.61) (0.40)
Dierence for 2002 - Dierence for 1980-1995 0.68 -0.40 0.45
(0.36) (0.49) (0.29)
Total Revenue from Underpricing (billion) 6.78 3.75 1.88
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the dierence between the price of the closest competitor and the ocial selling
price of the relevant Iraqi crude oil, in dollars per barrel. The entry in row 1 is the coecient on a dummy equal 1 for observations during
the Oil for Food Program (between the 10th week of 1997 and the last week of 2002). The excluded category includes observations before the
Oil for Food Program (between 1980 and 1996). The level of observation is a week. Entries in rows 2 to 4 are from one regression, and are
coecients on dummies equal 1 for observations during the stated period. The error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up to ve lags and
heteroskedastic. The entry in the bottom row is obtained by multiplying the amount of the relevant Iraqi oil sold in each week between 1997 and
2002 by the dierence between the price dierence observed in each week between 1997 and 2002 and the average price dierence for the period
1980-1995. (See Equation 3).Table 2: Dierence Between the Market Price of Iraqi Olis and the ocial selling Price of Iraqi Oils
Basrah Market Price Kirkuk Market Price
- Basrah Ocial Selling Price - Kirkuk Ocial Selling Price
(1) (2)
Model 1: Overall Estimates
Dierence for 1997-2002 - Dierence for 1980-1995 1.64** 0.29**
(0.20) (0.12)
Model 2: Estimates by Period
Dierence for 1997-1999 - Dierence for 1980-1995 0.85** 0.33**
(0.15) (0.13)
Dierence for 2000-2001 - Dierence for 1980-1995 2.82** 0.40*
(0.24) (0.21)
Dierence for 2002 - Dierence for 1980-1995 1.46** -0.03
(0.22) (0.21)
Total Revenue from Underpricing (billion) 4.96 1.14
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the dierence between the market price of an Iraqi crude oil and the ocial
selling price of the same Iraqi crude, in dollars per barrel. The entry in row 1 is the coecient on a dummy equal 1 for observations during
the Oil for Food Program (between the 10th week of 1997 and the last week of 2002). The excluded category includes observations before the
Oil for Food Program (between 1980 and 1996). The level of observation is a week. Entries in rows 2 to 4 are from one regression, and are
coecients on dummies equal 1 for observations during the stated period. The error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up to ve lags and
heteroskedastic. The entry in the bottom row is obtained by multiplying the amount of the relevant Iraqi oil sold in each week between 1997 and
2002 by the dierence between the price dierence observed in each week between 1997 and 2002 and the average price dierence for the period
1980-1995. (See Equation 3).
2
8Table 3: Type of Buyers of Iraqui Oil during the Oil for Food Program, by Year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total number of contracts 67 143 80 219 194 361
Average amount per contract 3.69 5.20 4.86 3.26 2.68 1.66
Number of major companies 23 28 14 25 5 14
Number of individual buyers 0 20 31 71 122 195
Number of other buyers 44 95 35 123 67 152
Top 5 countries Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia
US France France China Iraq China
Turkey China China France Jordan Liechtenst.
France Italy Turkey Turkey Syria Syria
Spain Turkey Italy Vietnam Switzer. UAE
Notes: Other buyers include companies that are not in the list of the world top 200 oil companies and government organizations.
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Coe. on Std. Dev. of Price of Brent 0.916** 0.306**
(0.094) (0.084)
After Retroactive Pricing
Coe. on Std. Dev. of Price of Brent 0.190 -0.067
(0.176) (0.191)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Each entry is from a separate regression. The dependent
variable is the estimated underpricing by week. The independent variable is the standard deviation
of the price of Brent in the 10 weeks preceding the relevant week. Estimates in row 1 are based
on a sample that includes weeks before the introduction of retroactive pricing (September 2001).
Estimates in row 2 are based on a sample that includes weeks after the introduction of retroactive
pricing. The error structure is assumed to be autocorrelated up to ve lags and heteroskedastic.
The unit of measurement for both the dependent and independent variable is dollar per barrel.
30Table 5: Estimated Amount of Bribes Obtained by Iraq from Underpricing (Billion of Dol-
lars)
If All Buyers If Only Individual
Pay Bribes Traders Pay Bribes
(
 = 1) (
 is estimated)
(1) (2)
Iraqi Bribes if Buyers Cut is 25% 4.580 2.166
Iraqi Bribes if Buyers Cut is 50% 3.053 1.444
Iraqi Bribes if Buyers Cut is 75% 1.526 0.722
Notes: Entries are obtained by taking the relevant fraction of the product of the amount of the
relevant Iraqi oil sold in each week between 1997 and 2002 times the estimated fraction of buyers
willing to pay bribes times the dierence between the price dierence observed in each week between
1997 and 2002 and the average price dierence for the period 1980-1995. See equation 4. The price
dierences used are the ones between the market price of Iraqi oil and the ocial selling price of
Iraqi oil. For example, the rst entry in column 1 is obtained by taking 75% of the sum of the two
entries in row 2 in Table 2. The second and third entry in column 1 are obtained by taking 50%
and 25% of the sum of the two entries in row 2 in Table 2, respectively. Entries in column 2 are
obtained by estimating 
 as the fraction of buyers that are individual traders in the relevant phase
of the Oil for Food Program. The unit of measurement is billions of dollars. See text for details.
31Figure 1: Dierence Between the Market Price of Close Subsitutes and the Ocial Selling































Notes: The top panel shows the dierence between the market price of Arabian Light and
the ocial selling price of Basrah. Arabian Light is the closest substitute of Basrah. The
bottom panel shows the dierence between the market price of Urals and the ocial selling
price of Kirkuk. Urals is the closest substitute of Kirkuk. The rst vertical line marks the
beginning of the Oil for Food Program. The second vertical line indicates the beginning of
retroactive pricing. The horizontal line is the average dierence for the years before the Oil
for Food Program. Iraqi oil was not traded in 1991-1993 due to the rst Gulf War; and in
1995-1997 due to delays in the Oil for Food Program.






























Notes: The top panel shows the dierence between the market price of Basrah and the ocial
selling price of Basrah. The bottom panel shows the dierence between the market price of
Kirkuk and the ocial selling price of Kirkuk. The rst vertical line marks the beginning
of the Oil for Food Program. The second vertical line indicates the beginning of retroactive
pricing. The horizontal line is the average dierence for the years before the Oil for Food
Program. Iraqi oil was not traded in 1991-1993 due to the rst Gulf War; and in 1995-1997
due to delays in the Oil for Food Program.




































1997.1 1998.1 1998.4 2000.1 2001.1 2002.1
Notes: In the top panel, each bar shows the estimated total amount of illegal revenues, in each
period. In the middle panel, each bar shows what fraction of the buyers of Iraqi oil are individuals
(as opposed to corporations). In the bottom panel, each bar shows what fraction of buyers of Iraqi
oil are one of the 200 major oil companies (as dened by Forbes, 2004). The correlation between














Notes: Point 1 represents the market equilibrium without underpricing and without shocks
to the demand or supply. The equilibrium price and quantity are P1 and Q1. With under-
pricing, the price paid by the oil trader is P2. The trader resells the oil to end users in spot
markets at the market price P1. Since the underpricing does not aect nal price paid by
the end users of Iraqi oil, there is no change in the equilibrium quantity of Iraqi oil, Q1. The
shaded area is the total amount of illegal rents (the quantity I in equation 3). These rents
are presumably split between Iraq and the traders. (The point s denes the split.) Point 2
represent an alternative scenario where no underpricing takes place, and the price drop from
P1 to P2 is caused by an increase in supply (the supply curve shifts from S to S'). Point 3
represent the case where there is no underpricing, and the price drop is caused by a decrease
in demand (the demand curve shifts from from D to D').
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Notes: The top gure shows the quantity of Basrah oil sold and the dierence between the market
price of its closest competitor, Arabian Light, and the ocial selling price of Basrah. A larger price
dierence means a larger underpricing of Basrah. A regression of quantity sold on the price gap
yields a coecient (std error) of -2.17 (.4.00). The bottom gure shows the quantity of Kirkuk oil
sold and the dierence between the market price of its closest competitor, Urals , and the ocial
selling price of Kirkuk. A larger price dierence means a larger underpricing of Kirkuk. A regression
of quantity sold on the price gap yields a coecient (std error) of -8.61 (4.34).
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Notes: The top gure shows the total quantity of Iraqi Oil sold (Basrah + Kirkuk) and the average
price, by phase of the Oil for Food Program. The vertical line denotes an exogenous change in
quantity sold between pahse 3 and phase 4. Starting in phase 4 of the program (beginning on May
30, 1998), the cap on Iraq's exports of oil was doubled from $1 billion every 3 months to $5.2 billion
every six months. Seprate gures on the quantity of Basrah and Kirkuk traded are not available
until mid-1998. The bottom gure shows the total quantity of Iraqi Oil sold and the average price
dierence between Iraqi oil and its closest competitors, by phase of the Oil for Food Program. The
price dierence is the dierence between a weighted average of the price of Arabian Light and Urals
minus the price of Iraqi oil, with weights re
ecting the average share of production of Basrah and
Kirkuk in the period where separate information on the quantity sold of Basrah and Kirkuk is
separately available.
37Appendix Figure A1: Dierence Between The Market Price of International Benchmark Oils





























































Notes: The 2 top graphs show the dierence between the market price of West Texas Inter-
mediate and the ocial selling price of Iraqi oils. The bottom 2 graphs show the dierence
between the market price of Brent and the ocial selling price of Iraqi oils. The rst vertical
line marks the beginning of the Oil for Food Program. The second vertical line indicates the
beginning of retroactive pricing. The horizontal line is the average dierence for the years
before the Oil for Food Program. Iraqi oil was not traded in 1991-1993 due to the rst Gulf
War; and in 1995-1997 due to delays in the Oil for Food Program.
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